如何在 Linux 中识别包含 Chrome 扩展程序的恶意软件?

如何在 Linux 中识别包含 Chrome 扩展程序的恶意软件?

我似乎被恶意软件感染了。具体来说,我时不时(通常每隔几天一次)会被重定向到一个页面,要求我下载某些内容,通常是“新版本的 Flash”。据推测,它根本不是那种东西,而是一种病毒或木马。

我在 Debian Linux 上使用google-chrome版本 30.0.1599.114,并且非常确定这是由扩展引起的。我知道我可以简单地卸载扩展或删除文件~/.config/google-chrome夹,但我宁愿不这样做。我想找出导致此问题的扩展并仅删除它。

在尝试调试此问题时(感谢@Braiam),我检查了事件记录器chrome://net-internals/#events并搜索了我被重定向到的其中一个 URL:

Chrome 事件记录器的屏幕截图

其内容chrome://net-internals/#events如下:

122667: URL_REQUEST
http://cdn.adnxs.com/p/d9/32/a3/72/d932a372371bd0a47ba7e2a73649a8d0.swf?clickTag=http%3A%2F%2Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%2Fclick%3FSRPvAE9aoD_c-TxO6i6ZP-kmMQisHO4_3Pk8TuoumT9JE-8AT1qgP3vmRkLiiPF6ljpJTzhxcH-5rRRTAAAAABwgIwByBwAAPwEAAAIAAADRAMMAVqgFAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgDHsgAAFIsAAQUCAQIAAIwAeiTtsAAAAAA.%2Fcnd%3D%2521NgbzOgjzkMEBENGBjAYY1tAWIAA.%2Freferrer%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%252Fif%253Fenc%253DgbdAguLHaD8eqb7zixJkP_LSTWIQWOk_Hqm-84sSZD-At0CC4sdoP2mCZbZYUNUFljpJTzhxcH-3rRRTAAAAAJL-IgB2AgAAUAMAAAIAAAA9ocQAN0sEAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgD8ogAA58sAAgUCAQIAAIwA9idtvAAAAAA.%2Fclickenc%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%252Fclick%253FXkiHhzB-Wj-D_TJz3IRWP3E9CtejcNU_g_0yc9yEVj9eSIeHMH5aP_ygL0YyHDQoljpJTzhxcH-2rRRTAAAAAEJLIQBJAQAAVwMAAAIAAACL0cUA0WAFAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgDQMgAAUdQDAQUCAQIAAIwA3yN4YgAAAAA.%252Fcnd%253D%25218gXSNwiT18QBEIujlwYY0cEVIAA.%252Freferrer%253Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.imgclck.com%252Fserve%252Fimgclck.php%252Fclickenc%253Dhttp%253A%252F%252Foptimized-by.rubiconproject.com%252Ft%252F9164%252F15602%252F101258-2.3581666.3755480%253Furl%253Dhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.downloadchop.com%25252Fgo%25252Flightspark%25253Fsource%25253Dybrant_lightspark-fr%252526adprovider%25253Dybrant%252526ce_cid%25253Dfra1CJb1pPqEp5y4fxACGPvMm5KknOL4eiINODIuMjI5LjIyLjE2NigBMLnb0pgF%252526subid%25253D2301980
Start Time: 2014-03-03 17:28:41.358

t=1393864121358 [st=  0] +REQUEST_ALIVE  [dt=334]
t=1393864121359 [st=  1]   +URL_REQUEST_START_JOB  [dt=332]
                            --> load_flags = 134349184 (ENABLE_LOAD_TIMING | ENABLE_UPLOAD_PROGRESS | MAYBE_USER_GESTURE | VERIFY_EV_CERT)
                            --> method = "GET"
                            --> priority = 2
                            --> url = "http://cdn.adnxs.com/p/d9/32/a3/72/d932a372371bd0a47ba7e2a73649a8d0.swf?clickTag=http%3A%2F%2Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%2Fclick%3FSRPvAE9aoD_c-TxO6i6ZP-kmMQisHO4_3Pk8TuoumT9JE-8AT1qgP3vmRkLiiPF6ljpJTzhxcH-5rRRTAAAAABwgIwByBwAAPwEAAAIAAADRAMMAVqgFAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgDHsgAAFIsAAQUCAQIAAIwAeiTtsAAAAAA.%2Fcnd%3D%2521NgbzOgjzkMEBENGBjAYY1tAWIAA.%2Freferrer%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%252Fif%253Fenc%253DgbdAguLHaD8eqb7zixJkP_LSTWIQWOk_Hqm-84sSZD-At0CC4sdoP2mCZbZYUNUFljpJTzhxcH-3rRRTAAAAAJL-IgB2AgAAUAMAAAIAAAA9ocQAN0sEAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgD8ogAA58sAAgUCAQIAAIwA9idtvAAAAAA.%2Fclickenc%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%252Fclick%253FXkiHhzB-Wj-D_TJz3IRWP3E9CtejcNU_g_0yc9yEVj9eSIeHMH5aP_ygL0YyHDQoljpJTzhxcH-2rRRTAAAAAEJLIQBJAQAAVwMAAAIAAACL0cUA0WAFAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgDQMgAAUdQDAQUCAQIAAIwA3yN4YgAAAAA.%252Fcnd%253D%25218gXSNwiT18QBEIujlwYY0cEVIAA.%252Freferrer%253Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.imgclck.com%252Fserve%252Fimgclck.php%252Fclickenc%253Dhttp%253A%252F%252Foptimized-by.rubiconproject.com%252Ft%252F9164%252F15602%252F101258-2.3581666.3755480%253Furl%253Dhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.downloadchop.com%25252Fgo%25252Flightspark%25253Fsource%25253Dybrant_lightspark-fr%252526adprovider%25253Dybrant%252526ce_cid%25253Dfra1CJb1pPqEp5y4fxACGPvMm5KknOL4eiINODIuMjI5LjIyLjE2NigBMLnb0pgF%252526subid%25253D2301980"
t=1393864121359 [st=  1]      HTTP_CACHE_GET_BACKEND  [dt=0]
t=1393864121359 [st=  1]      HTTP_CACHE_OPEN_ENTRY  [dt=0]
                              --> net_error = -2 (ERR_FAILED)
t=1393864121359 [st=  1]      HTTP_CACHE_CREATE_ENTRY  [dt=0]
t=1393864121359 [st=  1]      HTTP_CACHE_ADD_TO_ENTRY  [dt=0]
t=1393864121359 [st=  1]     +HTTP_STREAM_REQUEST  [dt=1]
t=1393864121360 [st=  2]        HTTP_STREAM_REQUEST_BOUND_TO_JOB
                                --> source_dependency = 122670 (HTTP_STREAM_JOB)
t=1393864121360 [st=  2]     -HTTP_STREAM_REQUEST
t=1393864121360 [st=  2]     +HTTP_TRANSACTION_SEND_REQUEST  [dt=0]
t=1393864121360 [st=  2]        HTTP_TRANSACTION_SEND_REQUEST_HEADERS
                                --> GET /p/d9/32/a3/72/d932a372371bd0a47ba7e2a73649a8d0.swf?clickTag=http%3A%2F%2Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%2Fclick%3FSRPvAE9aoD_c-TxO6i6ZP-kmMQisHO4_3Pk8TuoumT9JE-8AT1qgP3vmRkLiiPF6ljpJTzhxcH-5rRRTAAAAABwgIwByBwAAPwEAAAIAAADRAMMAVqgFAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgDHsgAAFIsAAQUCAQIAAIwAeiTtsAAAAAA.%2Fcnd%3D%2521NgbzOgjzkMEBENGBjAYY1tAWIAA.%2Freferrer%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%252Fif%253Fenc%253DgbdAguLHaD8eqb7zixJkP_LSTWIQWOk_Hqm-84sSZD-At0CC4sdoP2mCZbZYUNUFljpJTzhxcH-3rRRTAAAAAJL-IgB2AgAAUAMAAAIAAAA9ocQAN0sEAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgD8ogAA58sAAgUCAQIAAIwA9idtvAAAAAA.%2Fclickenc%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%252Fclick%253FXkiHhzB-Wj-D_TJz3IRWP3E9CtejcNU_g_0yc9yEVj9eSIeHMH5aP_ygL0YyHDQoljpJTzhxcH-2rRRTAAAAAEJLIQBJAQAAVwMAAAIAAACL0cUA0WAFAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgDQMgAAUdQDAQUCAQIAAIwA3yN4YgAAAAA.%252Fcnd%253D%25218gXSNwiT18QBEIujlwYY0cEVIAA.%252Freferrer%253Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.imgclck.com%252Fserve%252Fimgclck.php%252Fclickenc%253Dhttp%253A%252F%252Foptimized-by.rubiconproject.com%252Ft%252F9164%252F15602%252F101258-2.3581666.3755480%253Furl%253Dhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.downloadchop.com%25252Fgo%25252Flightspark%25253Fsource%25253Dybrant_lightspark-fr%252526adprovider%25253Dybrant%252526ce_cid%25253Dfra1CJb1pPqEp5y4fxACGPvMm5KknOL4eiINODIuMjI5LjIyLjE2NigBMLnb0pgF%252526subid%25253D2301980 HTTP/1.1
                                    Host: cdn.adnxs.com
                                    Connection: keep-alive
                                    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/30.0.1599.114 Safari/537.36
                                    Accept: */*
                                    DNT: 1
                                    Referer: http://ib.adnxs.com/tt?id=2301980&cb=1393864120&referrer=http://fra1.ib.adnxs.com/if?enc=gbdAguLHaD8eqb7zixJkP_LSTWIQWOk_Hqm-84sSZD-At0CC4sdoP2mCZbZYUNUFljpJTzhxcH-3rRRTAAAAAJL-IgB2AgAAUAMAAAIAAAA9ocQAN0sEAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgD8ogAA58sAAgUCAQIAAIwA9idtvAAAAAA.&pubclick=http://fra1.ib.adnxs.com/click?XkiHhzB-Wj-D_TJz3IRWP3E9CtejcNU_g_0yc9yEVj9eSIeHMH5aP_ygL0YyHDQoljpJTzhxcH-2rRRTAAAAAEJLIQBJAQAAVwMAAAIAAACL0cUA0WAFAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgDQMgAAUdQDAQUCAQIAAIwA3yN4YgAAAAA./cnd%3D!8gXSNwiT18QBEIujlwYY0cEVIAA./referrer%3Dhttp://www.imgclck.com/serve/imgclck.php/clickenc%3Dhttp://optimized-by.rubiconproject.com/t/9164/15602/101258-2.3581666.3755480?url%3D&cnd=%218yV7-QiCtsABEL3CkgYYACC3lhEwADj8xRpAAEjQBlCS_YsBWABgngZoAHAMeIABgAEMiAGAAZABAZgBAaABAagBA7ABALkBGWjVpdTIaD_BARlo1aXUyGg_yQFwmqHGvyLwP9kBAAAAAAAA8D_gAQA.&ccd=%21vwV6NgiCtsABEL3CkgYYt5YRIAA.&udj=uf%28%27a%27%2C+279660%2C+1393864119%29%3Buf%28%27c%27%2C+3152642%2C+1393864119%29%3Buf%28%27r%27%2C+12886333%2C+1393864119%29%3B&vpid=77&apid=189016&referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.imgclck.com%2Fserve%2Fimgclck.php&media_subtypes=1&ct=0&dlo=1&pubclick=http://fra1.ib.adnxs.com/click?AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAALTIdr6fGus_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA-Oj4oIzbJcljpJTzhxcH-4rRRTAAAAANYjIwB6AgAAEAkAAAIAAAAfKcUAD5wFAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgCqqwAAtdQAAQUCAQIAAIwA6xZV3wAAAAA./cnd=%21GgafOwjH0sYBEJ_SlAYYj7gWIAE./referrer=http%3A%2F%2Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%2Fif%3Fenc%3DgbdAguLHaD8eqb7zixJkP_LSTWIQWOk_Hqm-84sSZD-At0CC4sdoP2mCZbZYUNUFljpJTzhxcH-3rRRTAAAAAJL-IgB2AgAAUAMAAAIAAAA9ocQAN0sEAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgD8ogAA58sAAgUCAQIAAIwA9idtvAAAAAA.%26pubclick%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%2Fclick%3FXkiHhzB-Wj-D_TJz3IRWP3E9CtejcNU_g_0yc9yEVj9eSIeHMH5aP_ygL0YyHDQoljpJTzhxcH-2rRRTAAAAAEJLIQBJAQAAVwMAAAIAAACL0cUA0WAFAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgDQMgAAUdQDAQUCAQIAAIwA3yN4YgAAAAA.%2Fcnd%253D%218gXSNwiT18QBEIujlwYY0cEVIAA.%2Freferrer%253Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.imgclck.com%2Fserve%2Fimgclck.php%2Fclickenc%253Dhttp%3A%2F%2Foptimized-by.rubiconproject.com%2Ft%2F9164%2F15602%2F101258-2.3581666.3755480%3Furl%253D%26cnd%3D%25218yV7-QiCtsABEL3CkgYYACC3lhEwADj8xRpAAEjQBlCS_YsBWABgngZoAHAMeIABgAEMiAGAAZABAZgBAaABAagBA7ABALkBGWjVpdTIaD_BARlo1aXUyGg_yQFwmqHGvyLwP9kBAAAAAAAA8D_gAQA.%26ccd%3D%2521vwV6NgiCtsABEL3CkgYYt5YRIAA.%26udj%3Duf%2528%2527a%2527%252C%2B279660%252C%2B1393864119%2529%253Buf%2528%2527c%2527%252C%2B3152642%252C%2B1393864119%2529%253Buf%2528%2527r%2527%252C%2B12886333%252C%2B1393864119%2529%253B%26vpid%3D77%26apid%3D189016%26referrer%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.imgclck.com%252Fserve%252Fimgclck.php%26media_subtypes%3D1%26ct%3D0%26dlo%3D1/clickenc=
                                    Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
                                    Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,fr;q=0.6
                                    Cookie: __gads=ID=386c1f6bc0285adb:T=1390666421:S=ALNI_MZXJdGrAsWELFKRsS7QcqnPTkuaMw; uuid2=9182964126870747798; sess=1; icu=ChIIr54TEAYYASAAKAEwu8_EmAUKEgiCyRUQBhgDIAAoAzDGkb-XBQoSCKraFRAGGAEgACgBMIyKv5cFChII5I8WEAYYASAAKAEw0szplwUKEgjXlhYQBhgCIAAoAjDFvM2YBQoSCP7-CBAKGAUgBSgFMMjU0pgFChIIpogJEAoYByAHKAcwqtXSmAUKEgiDtwoQChgdIB0oHTCx29KYBQoSCNuECxAKGAUgBSgFMPbX0pgFChII0aELEAoYASABKAEwuc3SmAUKEgjLzwsQChgBIAEoATDrzNKYBQoSCK7fCxAKGAEgASgBMJfH0pgFChII0eQLEAoYASABKAEw5czSmAUKEgi78AsQChgHIAcoBzDwyNKYBQoSCL_yCxAKGAEgASgBMKzV0pgFChIIkoAMEAoYAiACKAIwrdvSmAUKEgi3hQ0QChgBIAEoATCv1dKYBQoSCMWnDhAKGAcgBygHMOzY0pgFChII_KcOEAoYBSAFKAUwisHSmAUKEgiIqA4QChgEIAQoBDCr1dKYBQoSCJ7pDhAKGAUgBSgFMMnK0pgFChII3ukOEAoYICAgKCAwuNvSmAUKEgi0hw8QChgBIAEoATC2ydKYBQoSCOeVDxAKGAUgBSgFMMnK0pgFChII_J4PEAoYASABKAEwrtvSmAUKEgi_lxAQChgDIAMoAzC8zdKYBQoSCNCkEBAKGAIgAigCML3N0pgFChII6acQEAoYBiAGKAYw5dfSmAUKEgjpsRAQChgGIAYoBjCv1dKYBQoSCMy5EBAKGAEgASgBMO3U0pgFChII1uoQEAoYASABKAEwstXSmAUKEgipghEQChgIIAgoCDCJy9KYBQoSCIaeERAKGAQgBCgEMOzY0pgFChIIh54REAoYAyADKAMw79jSmAUKEgjJpREQChgBIAEoATCbytKYBQoSCI-yERAKGAEgASgBMInL0pgFChIIqbcREAoYAiACKAIwisvSmAUKEgievhEQChgBIAEoATCtw9KYBQoSCP7GERAKGAYgBigGMNzT0pgFChIIofMREAoYAyADKAMwttHSmAUKEgjK-xEQChgCIAIoAjCx1dKYBQoSCJ6BEhAKGBsgGygbMNvX0pgFChII9ogSEAoYBiAGKAYw18rSmAUKEgjvmRIQChgDIAMoAzDP2dKYBQoSCI2qEhAKGAQgBCgEMLXJ0pgFChIInLASEAoYAiACKAIw0srSmAUKEgjXsRIQChgCIAIoAjDYytKYBQoSCKO0EhAKGAMgAygDMKjV0pgFChIIvrQSEAoYByAHKAcw19jSmAUKEgjFthIQChgCIAIoAjD0zNKYBQoSCLHAEhAKGAEgASgBMKDE0pgFChIIqswSEAoYASABKAEwzsrSmAUKEgiv0hIQChgDIAMoAzCPwdKYBQoSCOTYEhAKGAEgASgBMLTV0pgFChIIrNkSEAoYByAHKAcw7MLSmAUKEgj-2xIQChgDIAMoAzCx1dKYBQoSCInfEhAKGAIgAigCMMDN0pgFChIIxuASEAoYByAHKAcw3dnSmAUKFQj14BIQChjIASDIASjIATC429KYBQoSCPfgEhAKGAEgASgBMMDN0pgFChII9-ISEAoYBCAEKAQw5djSmAUKEgjw5BIQChgDIAMoAzD4wdKYBQoSCJXqEhAKGAMgAygDMI3F0pgFChII6uwSEAoYAiACKAIwpNLSmAUKEgjB8BIQChgGIAYoBjC_zdKYBQoSCOTyEhAKGAIgAigCMPXM0pgFChII5fISEAoYAyADKAMw-czSmAUKEgiG8xIQChgHIAcoBzDQ2dKYBQoSCIuJExAKGBMgEygTMMTW0pgFChIIoIwTEAoYBSAFKAUw7dTSmAUKEgjDohMQChgBIAEoATC21dKYBQoSCI-wExAKGAUgBSgFMLrN0pgFChIIxLATEAoYBiAGKAYwqtXSmAUKEgjIsBMQChgDIAMoAzDzzNKYBQoSCLyyExAKGAQgBCgEMOnL0pgFChIIvrITEAoYASABKAEw2cnSmAUKEgj6shMQChgBIAEoATDbx9KYBQoSCMi2ExAKGAEgASgBMNnG0pgFChII5bgTEAoYAiACKAIwhNfSmAUKEgiXuRMQChgEIAQoBDDU2NKYBQoSCIq-ExAKGAYgBigGMMfC0pgFChIInsITEAoYASABKAEw2cbSmAUKEgibxRMQChgGIAYoBjCE0dKYBQoSCP_FExAKGAIgAigCMOjM0pgFChIIkcYTEAoYBCAEKAQwz8fSmAUKEgi3xhMQChgBIAEoATCfydKYBQoSCOvGExAKGAEgASgBMLjb0pgFChIIx8gTEAoYBCAEKAQw6NTSmAUKEgiFyhMQChgBIAEoATDTzNKYBQoSCI_KExAKGAIgAigCMMbU0pgFChIIu9ETEAoYAyADKAMw2sfSmAUKEgjr2BMQChgCIAIoAjC21dKYBQoSCIbbExAKGAIgAigCMLnb0pgFChIIzuUTEAoYASABKAEw8MzSmAUKEgj76RMQChgCIAIoAjCqydKYBQoSCIHrExAKGAEgASgBMKrJ0pgFELnb0pgFGNYE; anj=dTM7k!M4.g1IKw2hK`RZ[+9f#Abz#5Z8>#V-^@!KG9XLO4442ch)Pc]jvxZ!#GhOwx*meAdp/D)elWNRR%-I!MOpSn=J+VCrW%0=hj]Bz32M!LSOQ5gll*LP_br1!?zqWv$YT0!S8!Ssqbx<[gw>6wFG2.OXE$1'cEc8BdiTCWLi:P+XwDKQDr`LmI$bR^3u%?co]YbrY[FD44<J(CU/Gn<5H=tP`n<jx[Cz6px:fcFXbqHccp2?vY*$/m>4GqE.2:v`'pIRgJ@wKuwpOTY'2wRpvC`e.1o[gHdch:d8Ly_dx!x3SeM0^!qrZIi%XQ$0pC/UUYEnNS-^j>32us+UP1VB_*ML]?KovH`x8g7%)dRu@#?pr+Lx<$9w@Af%inZIpkFAP#Y`t[+c'OBbc?!FUlhh4fF<-9S<1`W1<W3_z!``x7Jhjeh
t=1393864121360 [st=  2]     -HTTP_TRANSACTION_SEND_REQUEST
t=1393864121360 [st=  2]     +HTTP_TRANSACTION_READ_HEADERS  [dt=330]
t=1393864121360 [st=  2]        HTTP_STREAM_PARSER_READ_HEADERS  [dt=330]
t=1393864121690 [st=332]        HTTP_TRANSACTION_READ_RESPONSE_HEADERS
                                --> HTTP/1.1 200 OK
                                    Server: Apache
                                    ETag: "d932a372371bd0a47ba7e2a73649a8d0:1393776550"
                                    Last-Modified: Sun, 02 Mar 2014 16:09:10 GMT
                                    Accept-Ranges: bytes
                                    Content-Length: 5255
                                    Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash
                                    Date: Mon, 03 Mar 2014 16:28:41 GMT
                                    Connection: keep-alive
t=1393864121690 [st=332]     -HTTP_TRANSACTION_READ_HEADERS
t=1393864121690 [st=332]      HTTP_CACHE_WRITE_INFO  [dt=0]
t=1393864121690 [st=332]      HTTP_CACHE_WRITE_DATA  [dt=0]
t=1393864121690 [st=332]      HTTP_CACHE_WRITE_INFO  [dt=0]
t=1393864121691 [st=333]   -URL_REQUEST_START_JOB
t=1393864121691 [st=333]    HTTP_TRANSACTION_READ_BODY  [dt=0]
t=1393864121691 [st=333]    HTTP_CACHE_WRITE_DATA  [dt=0]
t=1393864121691 [st=333]    HTTP_TRANSACTION_READ_BODY  [dt=1]
t=1393864121692 [st=334]    HTTP_CACHE_WRITE_DATA  [dt=0]
t=1393864121692 [st=334]    HTTP_TRANSACTION_READ_BODY  [dt=0]
t=1393864121692 [st=334]    HTTP_CACHE_WRITE_DATA  [dt=0]
t=1393864121692 [st=334]    HTTP_TRANSACTION_READ_BODY  [dt=0]
t=1393864121692 [st=334]    HTTP_CACHE_WRITE_DATA  [dt=0]
t=1393864121692 [st=334] -REQUEST_ALIVE

以及URL_REQUEST

122669: DISK_CACHE_ENTRY
http://cdn.adnxs.com/p/d9/32/a3/72/d932a372371bd0a47ba7e2a73649a8d0.swf?clickTag=http%3A%2F%2Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%2Fclick%3FSRPvAE9aoD_c-TxO6i6ZP-kmMQisHO4_3Pk8TuoumT9JE-8AT1qgP3vmRkLiiPF6ljpJTzhxcH-5rRRTAAAAABwgIwByBwAAPwEAAAIAAADRAMMAVqgFAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgDHsgAAFIsAAQUCAQIAAIwAeiTtsAAAAAA.%2Fcnd%3D%2521NgbzOgjzkMEBENGBjAYY1tAWIAA.%2Freferrer%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%252Fif%253Fenc%253DgbdAguLHaD8eqb7zixJkP_LSTWIQWOk_Hqm-84sSZD-At0CC4sdoP2mCZbZYUNUFljpJTzhxcH-3rRRTAAAAAJL-IgB2AgAAUAMAAAIAAAA9ocQAN0sEAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgD8ogAA58sAAgUCAQIAAIwA9idtvAAAAAA.%2Fclickenc%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%252Fclick%253FXkiHhzB-Wj-D_TJz3IRWP3E9CtejcNU_g_0yc9yEVj9eSIeHMH5aP_ygL0YyHDQoljpJTzhxcH-2rRRTAAAAAEJLIQBJAQAAVwMAAAIAAACL0cUA0WAFAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgDQMgAAUdQDAQUCAQIAAIwA3yN4YgAAAAA.%252Fcnd%253D%25218gXSNwiT18QBEIujlwYY0cEVIAA.%252Freferrer%253Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.imgclck.com%252Fserve%252Fimgclck.php%252Fclickenc%253Dhttp%253A%252F%252Foptimized-by.rubiconproject.com%252Ft%252F9164%252F15602%252F101258-2.3581666.3755480%253Furl%253Dhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.downloadchop.com%25252Fgo%25252Flightspark%25253Fsource%25253Dybrant_lightspark-fr%252526adprovider%25253Dybrant%252526ce_cid%25253Dfra1CJb1pPqEp5y4fxACGPvMm5KknOL4eiINODIuMjI5LjIyLjE2NigBMLnb0pgF%252526subid%25253D2301980
Start Time: 2014-03-03 17:28:41.359

t=1393864121359 [st=  0] +DISK_CACHE_ENTRY_IMPL  [dt=350]
                          --> created = true
                          --> key = "http://cdn.adnxs.com/p/d9/32/a3/72/d932a372371bd0a47ba7e2a73649a8d0.swf?clickTag=http%3A%2F%2Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%2Fclick%3FSRPvAE9aoD_c-TxO6i6ZP-kmMQisHO4_3Pk8TuoumT9JE-8AT1qgP3vmRkLiiPF6ljpJTzhxcH-5rRRTAAAAABwgIwByBwAAPwEAAAIAAADRAMMAVqgFAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgDHsgAAFIsAAQUCAQIAAIwAeiTtsAAAAAA.%2Fcnd%3D%2521NgbzOgjzkMEBENGBjAYY1tAWIAA.%2Freferrer%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%252Fif%253Fenc%253DgbdAguLHaD8eqb7zixJkP_LSTWIQWOk_Hqm-84sSZD-At0CC4sdoP2mCZbZYUNUFljpJTzhxcH-3rRRTAAAAAJL-IgB2AgAAUAMAAAIAAAA9ocQAN0sEAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgD8ogAA58sAAgUCAQIAAIwA9idtvAAAAAA.%2Fclickenc%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Ffra1.ib.adnxs.com%252Fclick%253FXkiHhzB-Wj-D_TJz3IRWP3E9CtejcNU_g_0yc9yEVj9eSIeHMH5aP_ygL0YyHDQoljpJTzhxcH-2rRRTAAAAAEJLIQBJAQAAVwMAAAIAAACL0cUA0WAFAAAAAQBVU0QAVVNEANgCWgDQMgAAUdQDAQUCAQIAAIwA3yN4YgAAAAA.%252Fcnd%253D%25218gXSNwiT18QBEIujlwYY0cEVIAA.%252Freferrer%253Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.imgclck.com%252Fserve%252Fimgclck.php%252Fclickenc%253Dhttp%253A%252F%252Foptimized-by.rubiconproject.com%252Ft%252F9164%252F15602%252F101258-2.3581666.3755480%253Furl%253Dhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.downloadchop.com%25252Fgo%25252Flightspark%25253Fsource%25253Dybrant_lightspark-fr%252526adprovider%25253Dybrant%252526ce_cid%25253Dfra1CJb1pPqEp5y4fxACGPvMm5KknOL4eiINODIuMjI5LjIyLjE2NigBMLnb0pgF%252526subid%25253D2301980"
t=1393864121690 [st=331]   +ENTRY_WRITE_DATA  [dt=0]
                            --> buf_len = 304
                            --> index = 0
                            --> offset = 0
                            --> truncate = true
t=1393864121690 [st=331]   -ENTRY_WRITE_DATA
                            --> bytes_copied = 304
t=1393864121690 [st=331]   +ENTRY_WRITE_DATA  [dt=0]
                            --> buf_len = 0
                            --> index = 1
                            --> offset = 0
                            --> truncate = true
t=1393864121690 [st=331]   -ENTRY_WRITE_DATA
                            --> bytes_copied = 0
t=1393864121690 [st=331]   +ENTRY_WRITE_DATA  [dt=0]
                            --> buf_len = 0
                            --> index = 2
                            --> offset = 0
                            --> truncate = true
t=1393864121690 [st=331]   -ENTRY_WRITE_DATA
                            --> bytes_copied = 0
t=1393864121691 [st=332]   +ENTRY_WRITE_DATA  [dt=0]
                            --> buf_len = 2612
                            --> index = 1
                            --> offset = 0
                            --> truncate = true
t=1393864121691 [st=332]   -ENTRY_WRITE_DATA
                            --> bytes_copied = 2612
t=1393864121692 [st=333]   +ENTRY_WRITE_DATA  [dt=0]
                            --> buf_len = 1448
                            --> index = 1
                            --> offset = 2612
                            --> truncate = true
t=1393864121692 [st=333]   -ENTRY_WRITE_DATA
                            --> bytes_copied = 1448
t=1393864121692 [st=333]   +ENTRY_WRITE_DATA  [dt=0]
                            --> buf_len = 1195
                            --> index = 1
                            --> offset = 4060
                            --> truncate = true
t=1393864121692 [st=333]   -ENTRY_WRITE_DATA
                            --> bytes_copied = 1195
t=1393864121693 [st=334]    ENTRY_CLOSE
t=1393864121709 [st=350] -DISK_CACHE_ENTRY_IMPL

扫描显示DISK_CACHE_ENTRY它是干净的:

$ sudo clamscan -r .config/google-chrome/
[...]
Known viruses: 3138491
Engine version: 0.97.8
Scanned directories: 543
Scanned files: 1511
Infected files: 0
Data scanned: 70.93 MB
Data read: 135.29 MB (ratio 0.52:1)
Time: 22.528 sec (0 m 22 s)

所服务的页面通常(可能总是,不确定)位于域中xxx.adnx.comxxx部分会有所不同)。在目录中搜索该字符串google-chrome将返回:

$ grep -lR adnx .config/google-chrome/
.config/google-chrome/Default/Preferences
.config/google-chrome/Default/History Provider Cache
.config/google-chrome/Default/Cookies
.config/google-chrome/Default/Current Tabs
.config/google-chrome/Default/History
.config/google-chrome/Default/Archived History
.config/google-chrome/Default/Pepper Data/Shockwave Flash/WritableRoot/#SharedObjects/Y255TG9H/macromedia.com/support/flashplayer/sys/#cdn.adnxs.com/settings.sol
.config/google-chrome/Default/Pepper Data/Shockwave Flash/WritableRoot/#SharedObjects/Y255TG9H/macromedia.com/support/flashplayer/sys/settings.sol
.config/google-chrome/Default/Favicons-journal
.config/google-chrome/Default/Preferences~
.config/google-chrome/Default/Favicons
.config/google-chrome/Default/Cookies-journal

我安装的附加组件如下。它们来自 Chrome 的附加组件商店:

"View Vote totals" without 1000 rep
AutoReviewComments 1.3.0
Chat Reply Helper for Stack Exchange sites 2.4.0
Close Tabs 1.1
Desktop Notifications for Stack Exchange 1.6.5.1
Docs PDF/PowerPoint Viewer (by Google) 3.10
Edit with Emacs 1.13
Hangout Chat Notifications 2.0.0
IE Tab 6.1.21.1
KBD Button for Stack Exchange sites 0.2.0
Sexy Undo Close Tab 7.4.13
Smooth Gestures 0.17.14
SmoothGestures: Plugin 0.9.1
Yet another flags 0.9.10.0

这些来自堆栈应用

Dude, where's my cursor 1.0
SE Comment Link Helper 1.0
Super User Automatic Corrector 1.0
threading-comments 1.0
stackexchange-tab-editing 1.0

已安装的插件:

屏幕截图显示已安装的插件

我如何使用此信息(或任何其他信息)来识别哪个附加组件导致了此问题?

答案1

我不确定您的具体问题是否属于这种情况,但确实存在已知良好的扩展程序被出售给第三方,然后第三方利用该扩展程序进行恶意攻击的情况。下面是一个讨论此问题的故事:Google Chrome 扩展程序被出售给恶意广告软件公司

摘抄

Ars Technica 的 Ron Amadeo 最近写道一篇文章关于广告软件供应商购买 Chrome 扩展程序以放置恶意的广告注入更新。

Google Chrome 具有自动更新功能,以确保用户始终使用最新更新。显然,Google Chrome 是由 Google 直接更新的。但是,此更新过程因此包括 Chrome 的扩展程序。Chrome 扩展程序由扩展程序所有者更新,用户可自行判断扩展程序所有者是否值得信赖。

当用户下载扩展程序时,他们就授予扩展程序所有者随时将新代码推送到其浏览器的权限。

不可避免的是,广告软件供应商从扩展程序作者那里购买扩展程序,从而购买用户。这些供应商将广告软件推送给扩展程序的每个用户,这可能会带来危险的浏览体验。

一位 Google 扩展程序作者给出他的个人账户他在一篇博客文章《我卖掉了一个 Chrome 扩展程序,但这是一个糟糕的决定》中谈到了这一点。

我的建议是认真对待这种情况,并禁用不确定的扩展。然后我会监控情况,看看它是会平息还是会继续。

如果这种情况持续发生,那么我会深入研究并开始仔细检查你使用的 DNS 服务器。我通常使用开放DNS正是出于这个原因,因为这项服务(免费)试图通过将 DNS 查找重定向到备用 OpenDNS 页面来阻止攻击媒介。

为什么要关心 DNS?

如果已知主机名与垃圾邮件/黑客/网络钓鱼相关活动有关,OpenDNS DNS 服务器将故意增强您进行查询时返回的结果。它们处于一个独特的位置,因为它们对客户访问的每个站点执行查询,因此它们可以检测到异常(请参见此处):OPENDNS 网络钓鱼保护, 也这里

还有什么?

我还会确保您的/etc/hosts文件没有受到损害,并继续使用类似的方法来监控情况nethog,它将显示哪些进程正在访问您的网络。

Amit Agarwal 在不到一小时内就为 Chrome 创建了一个 Feedly 扩展程序,并在不知情的情况下以四位数的价格将其卖给了广告软件供应商。该扩展程序在出售时在 Chrome 上有 30,000 多名用户。新所有者向 Chrome 商店推送了更新,将广告软件和联盟链接注入了用户的浏览体验。虽然由于 Agarwal 的忏悔引起了公众的关注,该扩展程序已被删除,但这种现象在 Chrome 扩展程序中非常常见。

答案2

查看扩展的评论流畅的手势直接链接)。

如果您按日期对评论进行排序(点击最近的),你会发现几乎所有新评论都是一星评价,并且抱怨恶意广告:

李凯文1天前

出售给添加广告的第三方公司,并提供付费删除广告功能。

苏雷什·纳格斯瓦兰3天前

讨厌广告。它运行良好,直到它开始在我的浏览体验中插入广告。我本来会付费继续使用它,但我强烈反对它的鬼祟行为。它几乎就是间谍软件。

约翰·史密斯6天前

不要使用这个。它会注入 JS 来点击劫持,并导致 https 的 XSS 安全问题。

托马斯·赫拉瓦切克2014 年 2 月 23 日

太垃圾了……还记得未经授权的 URL 偷偷溜走事件吗?然后他们开始强迫用户“捐款”,否则就得忍受广告。它甚至开始在某些页面上滞后(在所有这些“改进”之前情况并非如此)。所以我换成了 CrxMouse,现在一切正常。

凯尔·巴尔2014 年 2 月 19 日

这是一款可靠的鼠标手势扩展程序,但新添加的广告却令人讨厌。首先,因为扩展程序会更新并默默添加广告,所以你不知道它们来自哪里。在这里,我使用多个恶意软件扫描程序扫描我的计算机,因为我收到了随机广告,直到我意识到这是 Smooth Gestures 插入的。

没有任何理由再使用这个扩展,而且我个人想知道是谁开发了这个扩展,这样我就可以确保将来不会安装他们提供的任何东西。

看起来那人就是罪魁祸首。

答案3

除了这里的答案之外,我还发现了一些更有用的资源。

  1. 这个 howtogeek文章推荐一个名为Fiddler它充当 Web 调试代理,允许你检查网络请求(目前有一个 alpha 版本Linux 版本)@slm 指出这个答案在 SO 上也有各种类似的程序。

  2. chrome的页面中的开发者模式chrome://extensions可以检查各个扩展程序在后台运行的进程:

    在此处输入图片描述

    单击打开background.htmlchrome 的开发人员工具窗口,您可以轻松查看扩展程序包含的各种脚本的源代码。在这种情况下,我注意到supportSexy Undo Close Tab 的源代码树中一个名为 的文件夹,其中包含一个名为 的脚本,background.js该脚本看起来很可疑(它生成随机时间间隔,符合我的症状)。

  3. 这个其他的 howtogeek文章有一个已知要避免的扩展列表,但更好的是http://www.extensiondefender.com这似乎是用户生成的恶意扩展数据库。但是,他们没有说明某个扩展如何或为何被标记为恶意软件或广告软件,因此也许应该持保留态度。

  4. extensiondefender.com 背后的人(不管他们是谁)还开发了一个非常酷的小扩展,叫做,(鼓声)扩展防御者。这既可以让您扫描现有扩展以​​查找已知的“坏”扩展,也可以阻止安装黑名单扩展。

因此,在我的 OP 中的扩展中,流畅的手势(感谢@Dennis)和性感撤消关闭标签是广告软件。根据support/background.js后者文件的源代码,我确信其中一个是随机劫持我当前页面的程序,但我需要几天时间才能确定。

另一个有用的扩展是扩展更新通知程序(谢谢@丹尼斯) 它显然会在扩展程序更新时通知您,这有助于在更新添加了此类行为时识别罪魁祸首。

答案4

一个不错的起点是使用 Chrome 扩展程序“shield for chrome”。它将帮助发现存在已知问题的扩展程序。它在 Chrome 网上应用店中提供,免费、精简且非常易于使用。 https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/shield-for-chrome/cbaffjopmgmcijlkoafmgnaiciogpdel

或者“扩展防御者”。 https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/extension-defender/lkakdehcmmnojcdalpkfgmhphnicaonm?hl=en

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