我以前遇到过这个问题，我相信我通过删除或更改图片的位置解决了这个问题。但这不是理想的方法，我正在寻找另一种方法来解决这个问题。
错误信息是：
Output loop---100 consecutive dead cycles.
\clearpage ...rite \m@ne {}\vbox {}\penalty -\@Mi
l.304 \end{document}
我不想发布我的整个程序，因为看起来很麻烦，但如果我只展示序言，也许会有所帮助？
\documentclass[twocolumn]{article}
\usepackage{booktabs, makecell, tabularx}
\renewcommand\theadfont{\normalsize}
\renewcommand\theadgape{}
\setcellgapes{2pt}
\newcolumntype{L}{>{\raggedright\arraybackslash}X}
\usepackage{caption}
\usepackage{textcomp}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\raggedbottom
\usepackage{geometry}
\usepackage{rotating}
\usepackage{booktabs, makecell}
\usepackage[referable]{threeparttablex}
\usepackage{siunitx}
\usepackage[skip=1ex]{caption}
\usepackage{upquote}
谢谢！
PS：我尝试过\maxdeadcycles=200，但是没有帮助。
@EGREG如果这有帮助，这里是整个程序：
\documentclass[twocolumn]{article}
\usepackage{booktabs, makecell, tabularx}
\renewcommand\theadfont{\normalsize}
\renewcommand\theadgape{}
\setcellgapes{2pt}
\newcolumntype{L}{>{\raggedright\arraybackslash}X}
\usepackage{caption}
\usepackage{textcomp}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\raggedbottom
\usepackage{geometry}
\usepackage{rotating}
\usepackage{booktabs, makecell}
\usepackage[referable]{threeparttablex}
\usepackage{siunitx}
\usepackage[skip=1ex]{caption}
\usepackage{upquote}
\title{\LARGE \bf ECON 425 Term Paper}
\author{Anthony Morabito}
\begin{document}
\maketitle
\thispagestyle{empty}
\pagestyle{empty}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\begin{abstract}
This is the abstract.
\end{abstract}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\section{INTRODUCTION}
\textquotesingle{This\textquotesingle} is the intro.
%\includegraphics[width=8cm,height=7cm]{bubble.png}
\section{Literature Review}
Joskow, Rose, Wolfram (1996) explores the effect of political constraints and regulation on the compensation of executives in state-regulated electric utility industries. They find firstly that executives at ‘proconsumer’ firms earn less than those at firms characterized as being friendly to investors. Secondly, the authors find that tenure rules affect executive compensation in ways consistent with the political constraint hypothesis.
Hallock and Oyer (1999) investigate how the pay-performance link varies over the fiscal year. They ask whether the board of directors focus on executive performance closer to compensation decision times or provide constant incentives for executives throughout the year. They find that the timing of compensation throughout the year does not affect executive pay. And, while CEO’s can ‘game’ their compensation by a nontrivial amount by manipulating the timing of profits, it does not make up a major portion of CEO pay.
Greg, Jewell, and Tonks (2011) apply their work on the principle-agent problem to the financial services industry, examining the pay-performance relationship in the context of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. They find that while pay in this sector is high, the pay-performance sensitivity is not significantly higher than in other sectors. They conclude that it is unlikely that incentive structures are the reason bank executives focused on short-term results.
\section{Theoretical Framework}
The significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation has attracted the interest of academics in recent decades\footnote{Murphy 1999 reveals that CEO pay research has grown at an even faster rate than CEO compensation, with 1-2 papers published per year prior to 1985 and sixty in 1995. This increase in interest arose from the bull market of the 1990s.}. The disconnect between ownership and control in firms is known as the agency problem (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and much literature is focused on understanding and trying to solve it (Harris and Raviv, 1977; Holmstrom, 1979; Mirrlees, 1976; Shavel, 1979). Approaches to the agency problem include the optimal contracting approach and the managerial power approach.
\subsection{Optimal Contracting}
The dominant approach, optimal contracting, views executive compensation as designed to minimize the agency costs that exist between executives and shareholders. By linking executive compensation to shareholder wealth, making the pay-performance relationship more ‘sensitive,’ a board of directors can align the interests of these two groups.
\subsection{Managerial Power}
An alternative approach to optimal contracting is the managerial power approach. In this approach, executives deviate from the optimal contract. This can arise for several reasons, Bebchuck, Fried, and Walker (2002) identify several: directors are captured or subject to influence by management, sympathetic to management, or simply ineffectual in overseeing compensation. Due to managerial power, executives may be paid in excess of what is optimal for shareholders. Moreover, to “camouflage or facilitate” this rent-earning, managerial power can lead to inefficient incentive structures, which further erodes shareholder value.
\subsection{Effects on Compensation Arrangements}
While these two approaches differ conceptually, it is possible that both can affect compensation arrangements. Compensation arrangements cannot be explained by optimal contracting alone, as it is replete with limitations \footnote{Optimal compensation contracts could result from effective arm’s length bargaining between the board and the executives, from market constraints that induce players to adopt such contracts even in the absence of arm’s length bargaining, or from shareholders’ ability to directly shape executive compensation arrangements. Our analysis indicates that none of these forces can be expected to constrain executive compensation effectively. Bargaining with the board is in fact far from arm’s length. Market forces are not sufficiently strong and fine-tuned to eliminate substantial deviations from optimal contracting. And shareholders have little practical ability to prevent such deviations (Bebchuck, Fried, and Walker (2002))}. For the same reasons optimal contracting is limited, managerial power is consequential. These reasons also suggest that the greater a manager’s influence, the greater his or her ability to influence pay arrangements to extract further rents.
There are mechanisms through which compensation arrangements can provide value increasing incentives for executives. Jensen and Murphy (1990) point out several: performance-based bonuses and salary revisions, stock options, and performance-based dismissal decisions. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the magnitude of these mechanisms.
%Before you begin to format your paper, first write and save the content as a separate text file. Keep your text and graphic files separate until after the text has been formatted and styled. Do not use hard tabs, and limit use of hard returns to only one return at the end of a paragraph. Do not add any kind of pagination anywhere in the paper. Do not number text heads-the template will do that for you.
%Finally, complete content and organizational editing before formatting. Please take note of the following items when proofreading spelling and grammar:
%\subsection{Abbreviations and Acronyms} Define abbreviations and acronyms the first time they are used in the text, even after they have been defined in the abstract. Abbreviations such as IEEE, SI, MKS, CGS, sc, dc, and rms do not have to be defined. Do not use abbreviations in the title or heads unless they are unavoidable.
%\subsection{Units}
%\begin{itemize}
%\item Use either SI (MKS) or CGS as primary units. (SI units are encouraged.) English units may be used as secondary units (in parentheses). An exception would be the use of English units as identifiers in trade, such as Ò3.5-inch disk driveÓ.
%\item Avoid combining SI and CGS units, such as current in amperes and magnetic field in oersteds. This often leads to confusion because equations do not balance dimensionally. If you must use mixed units, clearly state the units for each quantity that you use in an equation.
%\item Do not mix complete spellings and abbreviations of units: ÒWb/m2Ó or Òwebers per square meterÓ, not Òwebers/m2Ó. Spell out units when they appear in text: Ò. . . a few henriesÓ, not Ò. . . a few HÓ.
%\item Use a zero before decimal points: Ò0.25Ó, not Ò.25Ó. Use Òcm3Ó, not ÒccÓ. (bullet list)
%\end{itemize}
%\subsection{Equations}
%The equations are an exception to the prescribed specifications of this template. You will need to determine whether or not your equation should be typed using either the Times New Roman or the Symbol font (please no other font). To create multileveled equations, it may be necessary to treat the equation as a graphic and insert it into the text after your paper is styled. Number equations consecutively. Equation numbers, within parentheses, are to position flush right, as in (1), using a right tab stop. To make your equations more compact, you may use the solidus ( / ), the exp function, or appropriate exponents. Italicize Roman symbols for quantities and variables, but not Greek symbols. Use a long dash rather than a hyphen for a minus sign. Punctuate equations with commas or periods when they are part of a sentence, as in
%$$
%\alpha + \beta = \chi \eqno{(1)}
%$$
%Note that the equation is centered using a center tab stop. Be sure that the symbols in your equation have been defined before or immediately following the equation. Use Ò(1)Ó, not ÒEq. (1)Ó or Òequation (1)Ó, except at the beginning of a sentence: ÒEquation (1) is . . .Ó
%\subsection{Some Common Mistakes}
%\begin{itemize}
%\item The word ÒdataÓ is plural, not singular.
%\item The subscript for the permeability of vacuum ?0, and other common scientific constants, is zero with subscript formatting, not a lowercase letter ÒoÓ.
%\item In American English, commas, semi-/colons, periods, question and exclamation marks are located within quotation marks only when a complete thought or name is cited, such as a title or full quotation. When quotation marks are used, instead of a bold or italic typeface, to highlight a word or phrase, punctuation should appear outside of the quotation marks. A parenthetical phrase or statement at the end of a sentence is punctuated outside of the closing parenthesis (like this). (A parenthetical sentence is punctuated within the parentheses.)
%\item A graph within a graph is an ÒinsetÓ, not an ÒinsertÓ. The word alternatively is preferred to the word ÒalternatelyÓ (unless you really mean something that alternates).
%\item Do not use the word ÒessentiallyÓ to mean ÒapproximatelyÓ or ÒeffectivelyÓ.
%\item In your paper title, if the words Òthat usesÓ can accurately replace the word ÒusingÓ, capitalize the ÒuÓ; if not, keep using lower-cased.
%\item Be aware of the different meanings of the homophones ÒaffectÓ and ÒeffectÓ, ÒcomplementÓ and ÒcomplimentÓ, ÒdiscreetÓ and ÒdiscreteÓ, ÒprincipalÓ and ÒprincipleÓ.
%\item Do not confuse ÒimplyÓ and ÒinferÓ.
%\item The prefix ÒnonÓ is not a word; it should be joined to the word it modifies, usually without a hyphen.
%\item There is no period after the ÒetÓ in the Latin abbreviation Òet al.Ó.
%\item The abbreviation Òi.e.Ó means Òthat isÓ, and the abbreviation Òe.g.Ó means Òfor exampleÓ.
%\end{itemize}
\section{Data}
In this paper I use two datasets to estimate the pay-performance sensitivity. The Standard \& Poor's Execucomp database will provide executive compensation data. This is matched with The Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) dataset, which contains data on firm performance.
\subsection{Execucomp}
The Execucomp database contains annual compensation data for 74,300 of the top five executives of over 3,300 companies. For this analysis, I confine the sample to the time period 2010-2017. After dropping all executives besides CEOs, the new number of observations is 13,678. Since I needed one CEO for each firm\textquotesingle{s yearly return to measure the effect I was interested in, I removed all data from firms which had more than one CEO in a given year. Surprisingly, there were no observations for which this was the case. After finding cases in the firm data for which there were multiple return records for the same month/year, I dropped the corresponding observation in the compensation data, reducing the number of observations to 13,355. Variables of interest in this dataset include my dependent variable, salary, as well as other variables which will allow for a broader definition of compensation: bonus, stock holdings, and stock options.
{\centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{salary.png}\par}
{\centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{series.png}\par}
{\centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{comp_statss.png}\par}
Figure 1. shows the distribution of CEO salaries from the time period 2000-2017. The distribution appears normal, albeit a slightly longer right tail, which indicates that on average there is a larger amount of observations for high-earning CEOs then there are for low-earning CEOs. The next plot shows the trend of CEO salaries throughout the time period of this sample.
Table 1. reports summary statistics for various measurements of CEO compensation. These figures are in thousands, so the mean salary for CEOs in this dataset is \$823,900 and the median salary for CEOs is \$783.28. The variable bonus is the value of a bonus earned by a CEO in a year. The mean for this variable is \$185,360. The median is 0, which indicates that more than half of the CEOs in my sample did not receive bonuses. Stock awards represent the value of stock-related awards that do not have option-like features. The mean of this variable is \$2,578,050 per year.
Table 1. reports summary statistics for various measurements of CEO compensation. These figures are in thousands, so the mean salary for CEOs in this dataset is \$823,900 and the median salary for CEOs is \$783.28. The variable bonus is the value of a bonus earned by a CEO in a year. The mean for this variable is \$185,360. The median is 0, which indicates that more than half of the CEOs in my sample did not receive bonuses. Stock awards represent the value of stock-related awards that do not have option-like features. The mean of this variable is \$2,578,050 per year.
\subsection{CRSP}
I use stock returns from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to complement the compensation data discussed above. This database includes data from NYSE, NYSE American LLC, NASDAQ, and NYSE Arca stock exchanges. Important variables in this dataset include monthly returns, ticker, the most recently known trading symbol listed by exchanges and consolidated quote systems,including all temporary values, share classes and share type suffixes, and average volume.
The original dataset, a sample from 2010-2017, contained 677,216 observations. After dropping rows with missing return data, the number of observations dropped to 660,140. Next, I dropped multiple return records for the same month/year, which would complicate the annual return calculation. The new number of observations is now 603,203.
The merged CEO/firm dataset contains 12,650 observations, a decrease of 705 from the CEO salary data set since there were still observations in the firm data set that could not be matched with compensation data.
{\centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{return.png}\par}
{\centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{return_stats.png}\par}
Figure 2. shows the distribution of annual returns from the time period 2000-2017. These data are normally distributed around 0, and, since growth rates can be either positive or negative, this is to be expected.
Table 2. reports summary statistics for firm performance. These are the percent changes over the course of each observation year. As shown, the mean growth rate is 17.93\% and the median growth rate is 12.13\%.
{\centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{bubble.png}\par}
Figure 3. shows a scatterplot of the relationship between CEO salary and firm performance. There is no obvious correlation between these variables, and this is corroborated by the low correlation coefficient of -0.0271 in figure 4. below. This is surprising because one would imagine that higher earning CEOs belong to higher performing firms. Based on the graph above, there is no such trend.
{\centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{corr.png}\par}
\subsection{Explanatory Variables}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{\textit{Firm Performance}}
\par Firm performance is my main variable of interest as this parameter estimate measures the link between a CEOs performance and his/her firm's performance. Annual shareholder return was calculated using monthly return values, which were the holding period returns from month-end to month-end, not compounded from daily returns, and ordinary dividends are reinvested at month-end. Following this calculation, I verified my results with Yahoo finance to ensure that they were accurate.
\item \textbf{\textit{Firm Size}}
\par Volume, the the average daily volume of shares traded, is used as a proxy for firm size. Market capitalization would be the obvious choice to represent firm size, but previous studies have shown this to be correlated with shareholder return\footnote{Greg, Jewell, and Tonks (2005) "Executive Pay and Performance in the UK 1994-2002" Centre for Market and Public Organisation. Working Paper.}
\item \textbf{\textit{Industry dummies}}
\par North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes are used to incorporate data on firm industry. A total of 18 different industries were added to the regression. More than one had to be dropped from the equation, management and public administration, because these variables were a linear combination of other variables in the equation.
\item Annual return*volume
\item Stockawards
\item Optionawards
\item Othcomp
\item Age
\item Male (dummy)
\item Bonus
\end{itemize}
\section{Empirical Results}
%TABLE:
\begin{table}[htbp]
\caption{Estimates of pay-performance sensitivity}
\label{tab:table1}
\raggedright
OLS regressions of CEO salary and CEO total compensation on change in shareholder wealth. Standard errors in parentheses.
\medskip
\setlength\tabcolsep{4pt}
\small
\makegapedcells
\begin{tabularx}{\columnwidth}{@{}Lll @{}}
\toprule
\thead[l]{Dependent\\ variable}
& \thead[l]{CEO\\salary}
& \thead[l]{CEO total\\ compensation}\\
\midrule
Intercept & 434.319 & 6250.899 \\
Change in Shareholder Wealth (\%~Change)
& -0.318 (.083) & -2.638 (1.551) \\
\addlinespace
Adj R-squared & 0.253 & 0.062 \\
F-statistic & 145.65$^{*}$ & 34.10$^{*}$ \\
Sample Size & 11537 & 11529 \\
\bottomrule
\end{tabularx}
\smallskip
$^{*}$ Significant at the 1\% level.
\end{table}
\subsection{Model Fit}
\subsection{Additional Hypothesis Tests}
\subsection{Discussion of Results}
\section{Conclusions}
A conclusion section is not required. Although a conclusion may review the main points of the paper, do not replicate the abstract as the conclusion. A conclusion might elaborate on the importance of the work or suggest applications and extensions.
\addtolength{\textheight}{-12cm} % This command serves to balance the column lengths
% on the last page of the document manually. It shortens
% the textheight of the last page by a suitable amount.
% This command does not take effect until the next page
% so it should come on the page before the last. Make
% sure that you do not shorten the textheight too much.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%\section*{APPENDIX}
%Appendixes should appear before the acknowledgment.
%\section*{ACKNOWLEDGMENT}
The preferred spelling of the word ÒacknowledgmentÓ in America is without an ÒeÓ after the ÒgÓ. Avoid the stilted expression, ÒOne of us (R. B. G.) thanks . . .Ó Instead, try ÒR. B. G. thanksÓ. Put sponsor acknowledgments in the unnumbered footnote on the first page.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
References are important to the reader; therefore, each citation must be complete and correct. If at all possible, references should be commonly available publications.
\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{c1} Aggarwal, Rajesh and Andrew Samwick (1999). “The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of
Risk on Executive Compensation.” Journal of Political Economy 107(1): 65-105.
\bibitem{c2} Bebchuk, Lucian, Jesse Fried, \& David Walker (2002). “Managerial Power and Rent Extraction
in the Design of Executive Compensation.” The University of Chicago Law Review, 69: 751-846.
\bibitem{c3} Berle, Adolf and Gardiner Means (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private
Property. New York, Macmillan Publishing Co.
\bibitem{c4} Boschen, John and Kimberly Smith (1995). “You Can Pay Me Now and You Can Pay Me Later:
The Dynamic Response of Executive Compensation to Firm Performance.” The Journal of Business 68(4): 577-608.
\bibitem{c5} Greg, Jewell, and Tonks (2011). “Executive Pay and Performance: Did Bankers’ Bonuses Cause
the Crisis?” International Review of Finance 12(1): 89-122.
\bibitem{6} Greg, Jewell, and Tonks (2005) "Executive Pay and Performance in the UK 1994-2002" Centre for Market and Public Organisation. Working Paper.
\bibitem{c7} Hall and Liebman (1998) “Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 113(3): 653-691.
\bibitem{c8} Hallock, Kevin and Paul Oyer (1999). “The Timeliness of Performance Information in
Determining Executive Compensation.” Journal of Corporate Finance 5(9): 303-321.
\bibitem{c9} Harris, M. \& Raviv, A. (1977) "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information."
Working Paper \#70-75-76, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University.
\bibitem{c10} Holmstrom, Bengt (1979). “Moral Hazard and Observability.” Bell Journal of Economics 10(1):
74-91.
\bibitem{c11} Jensen, Michael, and Kevin Murphy (1990). “Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives.” Journal of Political Economy 98(2): 225-264.
\bibitem{c12} Jensen, Michael \& William Meckling (1976). “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360.
\bibitem{c13}Joskow, Paul, Nancy Rose, and Catherine Wolfram (1996). “Political Constraints on Executive
Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry.” Rand Journal of Economics 27(1): 165-182.
\bibitem{c14}Leonard, Jonathan (1990). “Executive Pay and Firm Performance.” Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 43(3): 13S-29S.
\bibitem{c15}Mirrlees, J. (1976) "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization."
The Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (1): 105.
\bibitem{c16}Ozkan, Neslihan (2011). “CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: An Empirical
Investigation of UK Panel Data.” European Financial Management 17(2): 260-285.
\bibitem{c17}Shavell, S. (1979) "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship." The
Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1): 55.
\bibitem{c18}Wallsten, Scott (2000). “Executive Compensation and Firm Performance: Big Carrot, Small
Stick.” Working Paper. 99-017.
\end{thebibliography}
\end{document}
答案1
我无法重现该问题，主要是因为我没有您的图片。但问题很明显\addtolength{\textheight}{-12cm}。
会发生什么？
您设置的页面高度太短，因此当 调用输出例程时\clearpage，\end{document}某些材料无法输出并保留在主垂直列表中。
引用 TeXbook 第 255 页最上面的双重危险弯曲，其中“循环”指的是如上所述的情况：
为了防止这种循环，你的输出例程在开始运行的时候应该总是取得某种进展。如果你犯了一个错误，TeX 可以帮助你诊断错误，因为内置了一种特殊的循环检测机制：有一个名为 的内部整数变量
\deadcycles，它在每次 之后被清除为零\shipout，而在每个 之前加 1。\output因此，\deadcycles会跟踪自最近一次 以来启动了输出例程的次数\shipout，除非你自己更改 的值\deadcycles。还有一个名为 的整数参数\maxdeadcycles，普通 TeX 会将其设置为 25。如果\deadcycles大于或等于\maxdeadcycles你的输出例程即将启动时的值（即\deadcycles即将增加时的值），TeX 会发出一条错误消息并执行默认输出例程而不是你的例程。
LaTeX 设置\maxdeadcycles为 100，因为在某些情况下，预计输出例程会被调用几次而不会触发\shipout（原因是浮动队列）。
balance您可以使用包；添加\usepackage{balance}序言并运行 LaTeX 来更好地平衡最后一页的列。
然后看看最后一页，它不会平衡。在左栏的前两段之间插入\balance
...end of the paragraph.
\balance
start of the next paragraph...
就你的情况而言，它应该放在 之前\bibitem。重新运行 LaTeX，最后一页将尽可能平衡。
答案2
maxdeadcycles通过添加序言来增加您的\maxdeadcycles=200内容。参见这个答案以获得完整的解释。