出于某种原因，Overleaf 将我的参考文献部分拆分为多个页面。有什么建议吗？
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\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\bibitem{c2} Bebchuk, Lucian, Jesse Fried, \& David Walker (2002). “Managerial Power and Rent Extraction
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\bibitem{c3} Berle, Adolf and Gardiner Means (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private
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\bibitem{c4} Boschen, John and Kimberly Smith (1995). “You Can Pay Me Now and You Can Pay Me Later:
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\bibitem{c5} Greg, Jewell, and Tonks (2011). “Executive Pay and Performance: Did Bankers’ Bonuses Cause
the Crisis?” International Review of Finance 12(1): 89-122.
\bibitem{6} Greg, Jewell, and Tonks (2005) "Executive Pay and Performance in the UK 1994-2002" Centre for Market and Public Organisation. Working Paper.
1994-2002
\bibitem{c7} Hall and Liebman (1998) “Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 113(3): 653-691.
\bibitem{c8} Hallock, Kevin and Paul Oyer (1999). “The Timeliness of Performance Information in
Determining Executive Compensation.” Journal of Corporate Finance 5(9): 303-321.
\bibitem{c9} Harris, M. \& Raviv, A. (1977) "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information."
Working Paper \#70-75-76, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University.
\bibitem{c10} Holmstrom, Bengt (1979). “Moral Hazard and Observability.” Bell Journal of Economics 10(1):
74-91.
\bibitem{c11} Jensen, Michael, and Kevin Murphy (1990). “Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives.” Journal of Political Economy 98(2): 225-264.
\bibitem{c12} Jensen, Michael \& William Meckling (1976). “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360.
\bibitem{c13}Joskow, Paul, Nancy Rose, and Catherine Wolfram (1996). “Political Constraints on Executive
Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry.” Rand Journal of Economics 27(1): 165-182.
\bibitem{c14}Leonard, Jonathan (1990). “Executive Pay and Firm Performance.” Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 43(3): 13S-29S.
\bibitem{c15}Mirrlees, J. (1976) "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization."
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\bibitem{c16}Ozkan, Neslihan (2011). “CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: An Empirical
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\bibitem{c17}Shavell, S. (1979) "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship." The
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\bibitem{c18}Wallsten, Scott (2000). “Executive Compensation and Firm Performance: Big Carrot, Small
Stick.” Working Paper. 99-017.
\end{thebibliography}
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谢谢！
